D
oes bank lending matter for corporate investment? On the one hand, if corporations have easy access to alternative sources of …nance such as internal …nancing, external equity, or bond issuance, then investment will be less a¤ected by how much banks are willing to lend. On the other hand, if corporations are strongly attached to bank lending, then disruptions in bank …nancing might a¤ect …rms' investment.
Starting from Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993) , this question has spurred a large literature. 1 Most studies are subject to the criticism of being unable to distinguish between pure supply variations in bank lending and changes in credit demand. However, the increasing trend of focusing away from macro-level to …rm-level data has o¤ered new opportunities to deal with this endogeneity. For example, in a recent article, Chodorow-Reich (2014) used cross-sectional variation in disruptions of banking relationships to analyze the employment e¤ects of the recent …nancial crisis. His …ndings point toward signi…cant e¤ects of bank lending for the employment of small …rms.
This article uses similar identi…cation techniques to address whether bank lending matters for corporate investment. To my knowledge, there is no work employing microdata on banking relationships to analyze the e¤ect of bank lending on …rm investment. The exercise combines income statement and balance sheet information on publicly listed …rms from Compustat with information from Loan Pricing Corporation's DealScan. Following Chodorow-Reich (2014) , I use DealScan data to identify the banking institutions in lending relationships with the …rms in the Compustat sample. For each bank, I construct an index-the bank lending ratio-summarizing how much banks decreased lending after the crisis compared to their pre-recession level. I then construct a …rm-speci…c measure of bank lending supply: the relative exposure of each …rm to banks that faced severe lending disruptions. Intuitively, a …rm heavily borrowing from a bank that experienced di¢ culties would …nd it harder to expand its credit compared with a …rm that was borrowing from healthier banks.
The key idea is that disruptions in credit could be considered an exogenous event for a particular …rm. For example, banks that experienced …nancial turmoil did so mainly due to their exposure to risky …nancial instruments such as toxic mortgage loans. Using this type of variation, one can abstract from traditional measures of bank lending that are more likely to su¤er from endogeneity. An example of such measure is the aggregate bank share of debt issuance (Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox 1993) .
It turns out that the two measures yield completely di¤erent results. The aggregate bank share is strongly correlated with the change in investment. During periods of lower bank share, …rm-level investment decreases. In sharp contrast, our "exposure" measure (a proxy for a …rm's ability to borrow) does not a¤ect investment in a signi…cant way.
A caveat of our exercise is that we focus on publicly listed …rms from Compustat. These …rms are typically large …rms that can substitute more easily bank lending with not only external equity …nancing but also internal equity. As a result, it would be a mistake to extrapolate our …ndings for the universe of U.S. …rms. It is very likely that bank lending can have signi…cant e¤ects on smaller …rms, which are not included in the sample. This paper contributes to the literature analyzing the e¤ect of bank lending on macroeconomic variables. Bernanke and Blinder (1988) develop a model that allows roles for both money and bank loans. Ramey (1993) studies the importance of the credit channel on the transmission of monetary policy. Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993) explore the existence of a loan supply channel using bank loan and commercial paper measures. Berger and Udell (1995) show that small …rms with longer banking relationships borrow at lower rates and are less likely to pledge collateral than other small …rms. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) show that banks cut their lending less if they were not reliant on short-term debt and had better access to deposit …nancing. Jiminez, Mian, Peydro, and Saurina (2014) analyze the impact of securitization of real estate assets on the supply of credit to non-real estate …rms. Becker and Ivashina (2014) also use …rm-level evidence from DealScan. While their main focus is to provide evidence of bank supply shocks, they also related the aggregate bank share to investment. As mentioned, we consider this measure to be prone to endogeneity. Hence, this paper exploits a di¤erent measure based on bank lending relationships.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS Data Description
To analyze the e¤ect of bank lending on investment, we combine two datasets. The …rst is the Compustat annual database, which includes balance sheet information on publicly listed companies. Since these companies are much larger than the representative …rm, our analysis is better viewed as applying to large …rms. The second dataset is the Loan Pricing Corporation's DealScan from Thomson Reuters. This dataset includes daily information on new bank loan issuances for a large set of companies both private and public. The information on loan characteristics includes (among others) the name of the …rm undertaking the loan, the amount issued, the issue date, the type and purpose of the loan, and the cost and maturity of the loan. Moreover, there is information on the name of the banks that act as a syndicate to lend money as well as which bank(s) act as book manager (leader of deal). Being able to identify where the loan originates is crucial for the analysis.
We will focus only on non…nancial U.S. …rms for the period between 2000-13. Investment is de…ned as capital expenditures on property, plant, and equipment (Compustat data item #30). Within DealScan, I exclude …rms in …nancial-and government-a¢ liated industries and only include loans used for construction of capital buildings or other construction, capital expenditures, and property development. This way I exclude loan deals not used for real investment purposes such as re…nancing, stock buyback, or mergers. We de ‡ate all variables by the Producer Price Index.
After these restrictions, we are left with a total of 2,022 …rms and a total of 11,390 observations. As mentioned, the DealScan sample includes a much larger set of …rms both private and public. In particular, it includes 21,457 …rms and a total of 114,989 observations. Table 1 provides summary statistics for loan issuance. We report these statistics for both our sample (the intersection of Compustat and DealScan) and the complete DealScan dataset. During our period, there are a total of 7,670 loans issued to Compustat …rms. The total number of loan deals in all …rms in DealScan is 29,447. The average amount of a loan deal is $263 million in our sample. In the full DealScan dataset, the average amount is $169 million. In both, the average loan deal matures in 3.8 years. We measure the cost of a loan deal as the spread over the LIBOR of the respective maturity. To compute the average, we weight each deal by its size relative to the total amount issued in the given year. In our sample the average spread is 132 basis points. In DealScan it is higher, around 166 basis points. In parallel with the decline in loan …nancing, the cost of loans rose sharply. The lower left panel of Figure 1 plots the average yield as the spread over LIBOR and the loan yield, which is de…ned as the spread plus LIBOR. The di¤erence between the two lines gives the LIBOR path. As mentioned, deals are weighted by their size. Loan spreads increased from 92 bps in 2007 to 315 bps in 2009. Although the spreads decreased in 2010, they stabilized at a higher level compared with the pre-recession level. However, the overall yield did not increase as much due to the decreasing interest rates of LIBOR. In 2013, the yield was signi…cantly lower than the pre-recession level. Finally, the lower right Note that the patterns outlined above seem to hold for the 2001 recession as well. Total loan issuance and number of deals decreased (but not as sharply). The loan yield decreased, but the spread over LIBOR increased. The only di¤erence is that average loan maturity was increasing from a low rate even from 2001 and accelerated once the recession was over.
The Identi cation Scheme
Our main goal is to understand how variations in bank loan supply affect the …rms'investment decisions. A simple approach is to regress the change in investment by …rm i in period t on some aggregate measure of bank loan supply in period t:
The coe¢ cient 1 gives the causal e¤ect of the change in …rms'investment due to changes in banks'loan supply if there are no underlying factors a¤ecting both variables. Hence, the identi…cation assumption is that Cov(Bank Loan Supply t ; " i;t ) = 0. This is a strong assumption that may very likely be violated. For example, changes in both investment and bank loan supply may be driven by business cycle conditions. In particular, …rms may decrease their investment due to lower expected demand and consequently decrease their demand for credit. Hence, investment may be responsible for the decrease in bank lending, not the other way around.
To distinguish pure bank loan supply movements from other variations, such as demand variations for credit, I consider two empirical measures of bank lending supply. The …rst is the bank loans share-the share of corporate debt issuance …nanced via bank loans. This measure is very likely subject to the endogeneity described above.
The second measure is based on bank lending relationships: it captures the exposure of …rms to "unhealthy" banks. Typically, banks lend to a large number of …rms. Hence, the decision of a bank to lend is likely to be unrelated to a speci…c …rm's performance. Moreover, banks that experienced …nancial turmoil did so mainly due to their exposure to risky …nancial instruments such as toxic mortgage loans. Hence, this measure could be considered as an exogenous event for the particular …rm and, hence, less prone to endogeneity.
Empirical Proxies for Bank Lending Supply
The Bank Share of Debt Issuance Our …rst measure of bank lending supply is an aggregate measure: the share of corporate debt issuance …nanced via bank loans. In particular, we de…ne the bank loan share in period t as
Total debt issuance is de…ned as the total bank loan issuance plus corporate bond issuance. For corporate bond issuance we use the Securities Data Corporations'New Bond Issuance database, which is again available through Thomson Reuters. Similar to loan issuance, we have information on the amount, issue date, maturity, cost, and issuer name for corporate bond issuances. The screening of bond issuance follows similar steps to the ones for loan issuance.
The left panel of Figure 2 plots the aggregate bond issuance alongside aggregate loan issuance. In contrast to bank loan lending, bond issuance increased between 2007-09. Issuance of new bonds totaled around $80 billion in 2007 and went up to $130 billion during the crisis. This was the result of more …rms choosing bond issuance as a means of …nancing. In particular, the annual number of bond deals increased from around 200 to 400 per year. In contrast, given bond issuance, the average amount of issuance decreased (but less than the decrease in the average loan issuance). In particular, the average amount per bond deal decreased from around $350 million to around $300 million. That means that on average …rms substituted bank loan …nancing with corporate debt issuance. This is consistent with the …ndings of Adrian, Colla, and Shin (2012) .
The right panel of Figure 2 plots the bank share of debt issuance. During the period 2002-07 …rms …nanced (on average) nearly 80 percent of their borrowing using bank loans. During the …nancial crisis, this share decreased dramatically to 30 percent. As mentioned, this was the result of …rms assuming less bank loan debt and at the same time partially substituting loan issuance with corporate debt issuance.
The bank share of debt issuance is a traditional measure of aggregate bank lending conditions also used by Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993) . While the latter paper considers only short-term debt (commercial paper), I consider bonds of all maturities.
Bank Lending Relationships
The second measure of bank lending is based on Chodorow-Reich (2014). While the bank share is an aggregate measure (indexed by period t) this measure is …rm-speci…c. In particular, I measure a …rm's exposure to banks that experienced reductions in their lending during the crisis. Being exposed to a bank means being in a business relationship with the bank in the form of acquiring a loan.
Disruptions are measured by the di¤erence in a bank's loan issuance before and after the crisis. Some banks exhibited a sharp reduction in their lending while others maintained a constant ‡ow. An extreme example is Lehman Brothers, which went out of business in September 2008. If a …rm was borrowing primarily from Lehman Brothers, then this …rm experienced a more severe tightening in its borrowing capacity compared to other …rms that were borrowing from other institutions.
The key identi…cation assumptions are 1) the continuation of banking relationships are unrelated to the individual …rm's performance, and 2) a disruption in bank lending is …rm-speci…c, i.e. it directly a¤ects a small set of …rms.
1. Banks' performance and …rms' performance. One question is whether a disruption in a bank's lending is caused by a deteriorating performance of a …rm doing business with the bank. There are a couple of reasons why we would expect this not to be the case. First, banks lend to a very large number of …rms often from di¤erent industries. In our sample, the median bank lends to 1,996 di¤erent …rms. Hence, a particular …rm may be too small to a¤ect the banks'balance sheet. Second, in the recent crisis, banks experienced …nancial problems depending on their exposure to particular assets such as toxic mortgage loans. Hence, the continuation of lending by a particular bank is likely to not be related to an individual …rm's performance.
2. Bank shocks as …rm-speci…c shocks. A typical loan is provided by a group of banks (syndicate). One of these banks-the book manager-leads, originates, structures, and runs the books of the deal. The book manager typically provides the largest portion of the loan. It is rare for a deal to include more than one book manager. The main question here is whether …rms use di¤erent banks for di¤erent deals or use the same set of banks for all their deals. In Table 2 , I calculate the number of banks that a typical …rm uses for borrowing. In our sample, 76 percent of …rms are borrowing from just one bank. These …rms have made, on average, 1.9 deals, which means there are many …rms applying to the same bank for a new loan. Sixteen percent of …rms are using two banks for an average of 4.4 deals. Finally, 5 percent and 1 percent of …rms are using three and four banks, respectively. These numbers corroborate the hypothesis that …rms typically borrow repeatedly from the same set of banks. Hence, it may be natural to think of a bank's performance as a "…rm-speci…c" shock.
The following section describes the construction of our empirical measure for bank lending. First, I calculate how many loans a bank made before and after the crisis. A loan deal is associated with a bank if the bank's name appears as a primary writer of the deal. 
The ratio is multiplied by 18 8 to adjust for the fact that the numerator accounts for a shorter period (in months) than the denominator. Figure 3 plots the bank lending ratio for a selected group of banks. The median lending ratio is 0.55: after 2008, the median bank gave almost half as many loans as it gave before the crisis. However, there is a lot of heterogeneity in the lending ratio, with some banks performing much better than others. Lehman Brothers did not give any loans in the period October 2008 to June 2009, so its lending ratio is 0 and the same holds for Bear Stearns. In contrast, institutions such as Wells Fargo, Societe Generale, Rabobank, and Fortis experienced strong lending growth even after the crisis. 2 The next step is to construct a …rm-speci…c measure of exposure to "unhealthy" banks. To do so, we calculate how much a …rm borrowed from a particular bank over the entire sample period 2000-13. We de…ne the weight as w i;j = $ Borrowed by …rm i through bank j Total $ Borrowed by …rm i
We then de…ne the exposure measure as
DL i summarizes the change in borrowing opportunities by …rm i before and after the crisis. If a …rm is borrowing heavily from a bank with a low lending ratio, then its borrowing opportunities decreased during the recession and vice versa. If a …rm used a balanced borrowing strategy, it is more likely to have a DL i close to the average lending ratio. It turns out that the average …rm has an exposure measure equal to 0.40 with a standard deviation of 0.38.
EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATIONS AND RESULTS
In section 2.3, we de…ned supply-side disruptions to bank lending using two measures: 1) the aggregate bank share and 2) a …rm's exposure to "unhealthy"banks. I have argued so far that the second measure is less prone to endogeneity than the …rst measure. The purpose of this section is to explore how bank lending a¤ects …rm-level investment using both measures.
There is a vast literature on the determinants of investment. The prototype paper of Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) tested whether investment depends solely on Tobin's Q or if a …rm's cash ‡ows matters as well. Our empirical speci…cation builds on their framework but also includes our variable of interest: bank lending.
In particular, the …rst speci…cation is
Equation (2) uses the "aggregate bank share" as a measure of bank lending. In this speci…cation, we make use of the panel dimension of our data between 2000-13. Hence, we have information for every …rm i at year t. We drop …rms that are in our sample for less than four years or …rms that do not appear in all consecutive years. The dependent variable I K for …rm i in period t is the change in investment for …rm i between year t and t 1 normalized by the …rm's total assets in year t 1.
As mentioned, we control for the …rm's cash ‡ows and Tobin's Q in period t. Tobin's Q for …rm i in period t is de…ned as the …rm's common shares outstanding multiplied by the stock price at closing time in period t divided by …rm's assets in period t. The main regressor of interest is "Bank Share," our proxy for bank lending in this speci…ca-tion. Note that bank lending is an average over …rms for every period, so it is only indexed by t. We also control for other …rm characteristics. In particular, X 0 i;t is a vector including log-assets, the leverage ratio (debt-to-assets ratio), and a dummy variable indicating whether the …rm paid some cash dividends during the year. Also note that this speci…cation allows the inclusion of …xed e¤ects.
In the second speci…cation, the main regressors are a …rm's "exposure to unhealthy banks,"which serves as a proxy for access to borrowing. The "exposure"measure is …rm-speci…c and is constructed using a ratio over years. Hence, the speci…cation relies on cross-sectional variation (variables only indexed by i but not t). So we cannot include …xed e¤ects here. The regression is
The dependent variable in equation (3) For convenience we present in Table 3 the coe¢ cients from a simple regression of bank lending (using both measures) to investment without any controls. The main takeaway is that results change sharply when we switch from one bank lending measure to the other. In the …rst speci…cation ("aggregate bank share") bank lending is highly procyclical and signi…cant. When the aggregate bank share decreases by 1 percentage point, investment (normalized by assets) decreases by 6.6 percentage points. In contrast, in the second speci…cation ("…rm's exposure") the coe¢ cient on bank lending is signi…cant.
As mentioned, Tables 4-12 in the Appendix provide the full set of coe¢ cients for both regressions. In all speci…cations that include the aggregate bank share, bank lending is strongly correlated with the change in investment. The coe¢ cient is statistically signi…cant and varies between [0.056-0.066]. Consistent with the results of Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) , cash ‡ow is an important determinant of investment alongside Tobin's Q. However, when we include the aggregate bank share, cash ‡ow loses its signi…cance. There does not seem to be any interaction between cash ‡ows and changes in the bank share for the whole sample. However, when we divide the sample between …rms with and without access to the bond market (Tables 6-9) , surprisingly, the interaction becomes signi…cant for …rms with access to bond markets. Moreover, when …xed e¤ects are included (Table 5) , size (as proxied by log-assets) is positively related with the change in investment and leverage is negatively related. Dividend payout is negatively related, albeit less statistically signi…-cant.
Results from regression 3 are presented in Tables 10-12 in the Appendix. In all speci…cations the …rm's exposure to unhealthy banks is not signi…cant. However, in this speci…cation, the interaction between cash ‡ow and bank supply is positive, which seems to go against the intuition that high-cash- ‡ow …rms must be less a¤ected by changes in borrowing opportunities.
CONCLUSION
In this article, I examine if bank lending matters for corporate investment. Following Chodorow-Reich (2014) , I use DealScan data to construct a …rm-speci…c measure of bank lending supply: the relative exposure of each …rm to banks that faced severe lending disruptions. I …nd that bank lending does not signi…cantly a¤ect investment. In contrast, a traditional measure of bank lending, such as the aggregate bank share of debt issuance, points to a strong relation between bank lending investment.
The exercise focuses on large, publicly listed …rms from Compustat. These …rms can typically substitute more easily bank lending with other …nancing tools such as external and internal equity. Hence, it would be useful for one to use the same methodology to examine the e¤ect of bank lending on small …rms. Unfortunately, to my knowledge, data on the investment decision of small …rms is not readily available. Hence, we leave this as a future research question. 
